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National Guard (ARNG) developing more operational capabilities. Although the ARNG is currently postured with some operational capacity while also serving as a strategic reserve -the scope of this research is focused on those impacts and changes inherent in becoming more operational. The rebalancing of national instruments of power to the Pacific Theater and recent updates to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3.0 Unified Land Operations are also considered. This paper addresses only the Army Guard while acknowledging the relevance to the other Reserve Components. The process of developing operational capabilities for the reserve components is on-going with the
implications not yet completely understood.
DOTMLPF Implications for an Operational Army National Guard
Prevailing in today's wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity -available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment well into the future.
-2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 1 Since 2001 the U.S. military has been involved in sustained combat operations in the middle-east while maintaining worldwide commitments. During that time the Army National Guard has transformed both practically and philosophically, from a strategic reserve of last resort to providing full spectrum operational capability to the nation. 2 The
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) came to the conclusion in its final report to Congress in January 2008 that the nation needs an operational reserve.
The commission, chartered by Congress, was to assess the reserve components and to recommend changes to ensure that they are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national security. 3 The first of the commission's six conclusions found that the nation requires an "operational reserve" and that neither Department of Defense (DoD) nor Congress have had serious discussions or debate and have not formally adopted the "operational reserve". 4 As a result of the findings and recommendations of the CNGR, DoD responded in 2008 with publication of Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force." The Directive specifies that the reserve components are to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. 5 This emphatically established the Reserve operational force concept within a policy framework. This research paper describes some of the impacts of this decision and provides a few recommendations for success.
2 DoDD 1200.17 is prompting action by the Services to continue working towards greater reserve operational capability. DoD continues to explore the potential to redefine the role of the reserve components for both domestic and overseas operations. Maintaining and increasing operational capability will impact all measures related to readiness, even with the highest level of organizational support. Negative impacts need to be identified, understood and mitigated early before degrading capabilities.
Strengthening the NGs capability is encouraged by the DoD as reliance on the Guard Using the Guard and Reserve in an operational capacity is a significant alteration to strategic employment. This transition is, in effect, a gradual change in national strategic planning. Using the Reserves in this way is not a doctrinal change in the character or conduct of U.S. warfighting but rather, it is an expansion of the current responsibilities and roles within a different legal and procedural framework. The development of greater operational capability will foster more frequent, long term and diverse use of Guard and Reserve forces. Additionally, there is new authority to mobilize reservists at the Service Secretary level, described in detail later in the paper.
Reserve Operational Capability is Not Optional
Adjusting to an "operational reserve" is not an option according to The Center for 
Training
The Guard currently has a higher overall level of readiness than normal, attained primarily from repeated mobilizations and the Army's recent acquisition efforts.
However, one weekend a month and two weeks a year is simply not enough time for The Guard has demonstrated that effective equipping, combined with adequate facilities, organizational structure and training for national defense, also serves to better prepare the Nation for domestic responses. 31 The Army will soon make challenging decisions with respect to equipment procurement and distribution. Provision of adequate equipment to the Guard is vital to meet both the global responsibilities of national defense and the requirements of the States for disaster response.
Compared with the February 2011 plan, the Operation and Maintenance request for FY2013 was reduced by only 3%, while a 15% reduction was imposed on the Procurement accounts. 32 This appears encouraging with respect to readiness, until the low equipment on-hand percentages in the National Guard are considered.
Procurement cuts will affect readiness in the Guard immediately, directly and significantly. Those units going into the ARFORGEN available pool must be appropriately equipped without necessitating extensive cross-leveling, which could break several units just to make one whole. Developing operational capabilities within the National Guard has implications that go beyond fine-tuning policy or designing new processes. Year-long deployments are accomplished repeatedly by the Guard but are never routine and were only somewhat predictable and required enormous crossleveling efforts. Besides adequate equipment, the Guard will need provision of ancillary materiel such as ammunition, fuel and spare parts. These operations and maintenance areas cannot be ignored. If left inadequately funded, this materiel issue will significantly hinder getting to those higher readiness levels.
Leadership and Education
AC and RC school capacity is not optimal and could potentially degrade National
Guard readiness if not addressed in the next few years. Other impacts are an expected modification to home-station training and pre-deployment training. 33 Under current circumstances, it typically takes about 90 days for pre-deployment training, which is too long for an operational force. The operational demands of recent deployments created a backlog for Professional Military Education (PME) in both the officer and noncommissioned officer ranks. Deploying Guard personnel require the same educational deferments provided to AC personnel or their developmental education and morale will suffer. The One Army School System is designed to support the total force and should operate without distinction between AC and RC.
Assessing demand factor for the future is difficult or impossible. Real-world mission deployment opportunities may become rare without an ongoing conflict.
Rotational deployments of any kind, especially overseas, help significantly in the development of quality leaders. Without regular and relevant deployments, the Guard could become an operational force without the prerequisite skills honed during the mobilization and deployment processes. It is those deployments, combat or otherwise, that produce experienced leaders. There is simply no substitute for the kind of hands-on education and direct leadership experience gained during a deployment.
Personnel
Developing Reserve operational capability is supposed to help sustain support for the All-Volunteer Force, according to DoD. The reasoning goes that the reserve force is spread throughout the United States and closer to the community than the AC.
However, it is questionable that a more operational Guard will correlate to support for There is no other way to fill out Guard manning rosters in the time available. Readiness is at risk if standards, as well as numbers, are not kept elevated, so the focus has to be on quality first without losing sight of the quantity needed. The AC drawdown will create opportunities for prior active duty personnel to move to the Reserve Components. This will help maintain, at lower cost, the skill levels of the RC for several years. should no longer be used in official correspondence or discussions. The terminology used in reference to building this capability in the Reserve Components requires specific clarification from DoD to reduce confusion and focus efforts. The term 'reserve operational force or capabilities' is suggested as more accurate and appropriate terminology in denoting the abilities of a unit to perform the role. 37 This distinction is needed to identify those units that are actually operational at any given time.
Analysis shows that DOTMLPF impacts of increasing Guard capabilities overall are minor and manageable. This change to greater capability is significant but it should not be considered revolutionary in nature or a new role for the Guard. It is a return to the nation's roots when the U.S. maintained much larger reserve forces than active forces and planned to take time necessary to mobilize before going to war. This still evolving operational capability does not transform who fights in war, what equipment is used or how the forces are arrayed in time and space on the battlefield.
Linking support for the All-Volunteer Force to greater reserve component operational capability should be discarded. The All-Volunteer Force has been successful, albeit costly, simply because conscription has not been required. Army soldiers, implementing sound doctrine and providing our troops with the best possible equipment 38 all in a cost-effective way. In doing so, our nations' security will not only be preserved but materially enhanced.
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